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Abstract
The principal aim of the GOLD project (Grid-based Information Models to Support the 
Rapid Innovation of New High Value-Added Chemicals) is to carry out research into 
enabling  technology  to  support  the  formation,  operation  and  termination  of  Virtual 
Organisations (VOs). This technology has been implemented in the form of a set of 
middleware  components,  which  address  issues  such  as  trust,  security,  contract 
monitoring  and  enforcement,  information  management  and  coordination.  The 
middlware components were the result of an extensive requirements gathering process 
which involved interviews with a range of chemical development companies and  past 
experience in the area of distributed computing. The analysis was assisted by the Soft 
Systems  Methodology  (SSM)  technique  [Checkland  and  Scholes  1990]  which 
highlighted a number of architectural elements required to support virtual organisations. 
This paper discusses these elements, presents the services required to implement them 
and analyses the architecture and services against the application domain of chemical 
process development.
1 Introduction to Virtual Organisations
The GOLD project supports the entire lifecycle involved in the operation of Virtual Organisations 
(VOs), by delivering infrastructural components to enable organisations to collaborate securely. The 
project focuses on a number of concepts such as trust, security, information management, contract 
enforcement and coordination within an environment comprised of autonomous services,  which 
together  form a  VO.  GOLD  explores  the  concepts  associated  with  VOs  using  as  its  primary 
application driver the need for rapid market exploitation within the chemical process development 
industry.  The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  initially  VOs  are  contrasted  with  conventional 
organisations; this is followed by a brief discussion of our application domain, focusing on the 
requirements  drawn from interviews conducted with  a  group of  chemical  process  development 
companies; a list of architectural elements is then presented to implement these requirements; and 
finally the services required to support these architectural elements are described.
As  discussed  in  Smith  [2005],  conventional  organisations  include  mechanisms  implementing 
attributes  such as  coordinated  activity,  security  and information management.  The  mechanisms 
usually employed in conventional organisations are typically not applicable in VOs because of the 
need  to  cross  organisational  boundaries  and  also  the  requirement  for  dynamism.  For  example, 
activity can be coordinated in conventional organisations for a number of reasons:
• the relative freedom of information within a single organisation;
• the existence of management hierarchies and disciplinary procedures;
• the relatively static nature of organisational structure.
In  a  VO,  the  need  to  cross  organisational  boundaries  makes  these  mechanisms  difficult  or 
impractical to implement and use. To coordinate activity, VO participants must adhere to some 
shared  infrastructure,  which  may  consist  of  standards,  software  implementations,  common 
procedures  and  common  document  types.  This  is  generally  impractical  for  organisations  with 
existing systems and procedures, and especially so in a highly dynamic environment where inter-
organisational  relationships  may  be  short-lived.  Similarly,  creating  a  management  hierarchy 
crossing  organisational  boundaries  is  likely  to  be  unworkable  as  common  rules  may  be 
unenforceable and trust, in a traditional sense, may be absent.
An infrastructure for building VOs must allow high levels of integration between participants, so 
that complex coordinated actions can be carried out securely and transparently. However, it must 
also promote dynamism, so that the resulting VOs can respond to changing situations in an agile 
manner.  This  paper  describes  a  set  of  fundamental  infrastructure  components  which  may  be 
combined and built upon to implement dynamic VOs. These infrastructural components have been 
divided into three levels as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 - Three levels of infrastructure
The infrastructure level ,which is also the focus of this paper, provides generic middleware services 
for building VOs (e.g. providing security, coordination, information management and regulation 
primitives). The environment level provides aggregated services, tools and additional facilities to 
enable  the  modification  and operation of  VOs to  be  more  effective.  Both  tools  and additional 
functionalities may be customised to target a specific domain. Individual, domain specific, VOs and 
distributed applications are described at the application level.
Components at the environment level may be provided by a third party, possibly an industry body 
or company that seeks to profit from providing VO facilities or added value to organisations or 
communities. For instance, a typical approach may be for an industrial trade organisation to act as a 
trusted third party by:
• hosting the essential core services
• providing additional functionality built upon these services by defining:
• libraries of common roles
• libraries of common data types
• the core information model
It might also be expected that the necessary client-side infrastructure would be provided as one of 
the benefits of membership of the trade organisation, alternatively the clients may receive assistance 
integrating their legacy systems.  The components at the application level may include convenient 
aggregations of infrastructure and environment level services (e.g. building on coordination services 
to provide workflow enactment or domain-specific data management facilities). Other elements of 
the application layer will consist of tools and libraries of information specific to a particular VO 
instance.
Once this basic infrastructure has been established, organisations might employ environment level 
services to provide tighter integration or more powerful coordination techniques. For example, the 
minimal infrastructural requirement for coordination is the sharing of an event model. However, 
this  (and other  basic  infrastructure  services)  could  be  used to  build  secure shared  workspaces, 
workflow enactment engines and other, more complex, abstractions. Because of this approach, VOs 
can be configured to provide a balance between the seemingly contradictory goals of integration 
and dynamism required for a particular application. It is also possible to reconfigure this balance at 
runtime if necessary. Even within a single VO, relationships between different participants might be 
more or less tightly integrated. For example close, long-term collaborators may wish to share large 
amounts  of  infrastructure,  which  will  tightly  integrate  them but  reduce  the  flexibility  of  their 
participation within a VO, whereas casual or short-term collaborators might view dynamism as 
more important than integration. The following section briefly introduces the application domain 
from  which  some  of  the  requirements  for  the  GOLD  project  were  drawn,  against  which  the 
implemented services are evaluated.
2 Chemical Process Development Industry
Chemical  process  development  is  a  complex,  structured  field  in  which  dynamic  collaborations 
amongst  a  small  group  of  partners,  each  specialising  in  a  set  of  core  skills,  are  common.  If 
successful, such partnerships can extend over multiple projects due to the mutual trust gained by the 
companies involved. A chemical process development project will generally consist of a series of 
well-defined stages each of which has an accompanying information dossier (Table 1).
Table 1 - Chemical process development stages
Stage Description Associated Dossier
1 Initial laboratory development work Technical information
2 Pilot plant or scale-up investigations Preliminary manufacturing
3 Transfer to production – sometimes referred to 
as technology transfer
Production information
4 Manufacture Manufacturing
Additionally, there may be general dossiers associated with the project as a whole, e.g. the Health 
and Safety Dossier or Marketing Information Dossier. Each dossier is comprised of a collection of 
documents relating to that stage or project,  for instance the Marketing dossier will  contain any 
documents relating to the potential  markets, possible customers,  price, current competitors,  raw 
material availability and existing suppliers while the Health and Safety dossier would be concerned 
with  safety  assessments  for  plant  equipment  and  operations,  such  as  HAZOP  (Hazard  and 
Operability) Studies. As the development project proceeds the initial, preliminary versions of these 
dossiers are elaborated upon by the relevant partners, for instance updating the content of existing 
documents and adding additional documents as required. Dynamism in the VO can occur due to 
unexpected problems in the process development, sometimes necessitating the inclusion of a new 
partner in the collaboration, an example of this situation is explored in the scenario in the following 
section. 
2.1.1 Description of a Chemical Process
The service infrastructure focuses on the manufacturing process of chemicals, starting at the initial 
laboratory investigations, through pilot plant trials, to production. This series of activities involves 
the coordination of tasks and exchange of information and resources over a wide variety of domains 
including  chemistry,  chemical  engineering,  plant  operations,  management,  marketing  and 
accounting.
Figure 2 - Chemical process development
Figure  2 illustrates some of the interactions involved. One approach to address this has been to 
identify non-core competencies and outsource these aspects of the business to networks of specialist 
providers. Different specialist companies may then be involved at all stages in the research and 
development lifecycle, providing services ranging from basic research or safety testing, to industrial 
scale manufacturing. Demchenko [2004] elaborates further on issues related to outsourcing within 
the chemical development process industry. The following tables describes the interactions in figure 
2.
Table 2 - Interaction descriptions
Interaction Description
1 Receive the requirements dossier from the Customer
1.1 Provide the route development requirements dossier
1.2 Receive the developed route
1.3 Provide the scale-up requirements dossier
1.3.1 Provide the specifications of the potential exotherm
1.3.1.1 Gain a validation of the model
1.3.1.2 Receive validation
1.3.2 Receive the validated thermal model
1.4 Receive the scaled-up model
Interaction Description
1.5 Provide the production dossier
1.6 Receive the shipment(s)
2 Send the shipment(s)
Customer  C requires  a  quantity  of  a  chemical  to  be  produced.  C sends  the  basic  information 
required  (end  product,  purity,  quantity,  delivery  date,  cost)  to  supplier  S in  the  form  of  a 
requirements dossier (see interaction 1 in table  2). It is assumed that  S provides a full chemical 
process development and manufacture service to C, however some or all of the activities required 
for this service can be performed in-house, or out-sourced. For the purposes of this example the 
activities  listed  in  figure  2 are  considered  to  require  out-sourcing.  S decides  to  out-source  the 
synthetic route development, as the chemicals and processes involved in this specific order require 
specialist  knowledge and laboratory equipment not available in-house (see interactions 1.1, 1.2, 
Table  2).  As  with  the  basic  interaction  (see  interaction  1,  Table  2),  there  may  be  extensive 
interactions between  S and the route development company (RD)  during the route development 
process, as issues are raised by the development process, however for simplicity these have been 
overlooked.  RD develops feasible synthetic routes for the manufacture of chemicals  given some 
constraints/requirements, typically purity, quantity, processing constraints, etc. Following the route 
development  the  scale-up of the  selected  route  is  out-sourced  as  this  requires  some  specialist 
knowledge not available in-house, for instance the use of software to carry out a simulation of a 
series of possible reactor designs (see interactions 1.3, 1.4,  Table 2). This company produces a 
scaled-up model suitable for inclusion in a production dossier for the manufacture of the specified 
chemical. In order to produce the scaled-up model, the company requires the chemical synthesis 
route and details of the other constraints such as the available operating plant, required volume, 
purity, etc. In addition to the previous interactions, 1.3 and 1.4, the scale-up company now also 
interacts  with  the  thermal  safety  company  (TS)  (see  interactions  1.3.1,  1.3.2,  Table  2).  This 
interaction is detailed later.
Once the full, production scale route/model is available it would be clear whether the supplier can 
meet the whole order in-house or would need to out-source some or all of the production to a toll 
manufacturer. For this scenario it is assumed that the supplier is unable to handle the whole order 
in-house and has to out-source some of the production to a toll manufacturer (TM) (see interactions 
1.5, 1.6, Table 2). While this current set of interactions are relatively static, there are cases where 
due to unforeseen circumstances, interactions may need to be handled dynamically. There are cases 
where additional activities within the process have to performed, challenging both the workflow as 
well the interactions between partners. Consider for example that a potentially dangerous exotherm 
has been identified tin the scale-up process that requires specialist experience/equipment to handle. 
Due to this unexpencted event, an additional external authority is required to validate the work. The 
process  now  requires  the  Thermal  Safety  and  Model  Validation  companies  to  deal  with  this 
unforeseen  circumstance  (see  interactions  1.3.1.1,  1.3.1.2,  Table  2).  Typically,  validation  is 
obtained externally to provide assurance as to the safety of the proposed solution.
The above scenario, although realistic, demonstrates only a subset of the actual set of interactions 
that would normally take place during a complete life cycle of a chemical development process. It 
does however highlight the need to manage business interactions; provide access control in order to 
protect  resources  belonging  to  the  various  companies  and  manage  identities  such  that  only 
authenticated entities are allowed to handle data (i.e. information dossiers). In addition monitoring 
mechanisms are also necessary in order to oversee contract enactment and coordinate the entire 
workflow.  Information  management  facilities  for  the  purpose  of  auditing  the  interactions  and 
storing the various data types produced are  also vital.  In the rest  of the paper the middleware 
services are described, with a brief discussion of the architectural framework.
3 Architectural Framework
The GOLD Middleware architecture has primarily been derived from the SSM model [Checkland 
and  Scholes  1990]  of  chemical  process  development.  The  process  of  deriving  the  required 
architectural  elements  from  an  SSM  model  involved  generating  a  series  of  SSM  models 
representing the perceived activities involved in the formation, operation and termination of VOs. 
The activities in these models were then analysed and categorised into a number of high level areas, 
which formed the various elements of the GOLD Middleware architecture. Figure 3 below shows 
the main elements identified following the analysis of the SSM model.
Figure 3 - Architectural elements
Within the GOLD Middleware, VOs are characterised as a temporal composition of organisational 
entities [Norfolk 1995]. This implies that the topology of a VO may alter significantly as individual 
participants or resources enter or leave the VO. Therefore the infrastructure needs to be flexible, 
adaptable  and  capable  of  coping  with  the  dynamic  characteristics  of  VOs.  In  addition,  it  is 
undesirable to impose unnecessary constraints on the potential for VO formation by dictating the 
specifics  of  the  various  supporting  technologies  the  entities  are  required to  deploy  in  order  to 
participate in a VO. To support such a dynamic approach, including the need for late binding and 
loose coupling to actual implementation technologies, a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) [Erl, 
2004] based upon standard Web Services [Skonnard, 2002] has been identified as the most suitable 
means of implementing the GOLD Middleware. Web Services make it possible to use a variety of 
standards and protocols, and allow the integration of different software applications running on 
heterogeneous  systems.  Hence  the  layered  approach to  the  architecture  discussed  in  Section  1 
supports a highly configurable approach to VO design, largely because the infrastructure, which all 
participants of a VO are forced to share, is minimised.  It is important to note, however, that the 
architectural  elements  described  in  the  following  sections  do  not  necessarily  map  directly  to 
individual services; rather, they represent high level areas of functionality that require one or more 
physical services to support them.
3.1 Security
The  secure  exchange  of  information  between  VO  members  is  essential  for  the  successful 
deployment of a VO. All information, access to shared VO projects, search functionality and data 
storage  must  be  subject  to  a  unified  security  infrastructure.  The  security  facilities  of  the  VO 
architecture must be able to authenticate a user when a VO session is initiated and then propagate 
this identity to other VO members and architectural elements during all interactions. These other 
members  and system elements  can then make authorisation decisions based on this  propagated 
identity, or on roles that are bound to identities. The authorisation process must also be able to 
support the evolution of access rights to resources as VO projects progress. For example, the access 
rights of a Chemist involved in the early stages of a chemical development project may alter as the 
project moves towards its production phases.
An example of such a requirement for time evolving access control rights is encountered when 
considering some of the information dossiers that are compiled during the process development. In 
the early stages of a project it is necessary for chemist and chemical engineering roles at all levels to 
have some form of both read and write access to some of these documents, however as the project 
progresses  and  reaches  the  plant  design  stages  it  would  be  undesirable  for  the  basic  chemical 
reaction  path  to  be  updated.  This  restriction  of  access  rights  could  be  modeled  through  the 
revocation of write privileges to the relevant dossiers of all but the senior members of the project 
team thus ensuring that updates could not be applied without due consideration.
3.2 Storage
As  VO  projects  progress,  the  quantity  of  information  generated  may  be  significant.  This 
information needs to be stored such that it is available to, and searchable by, correctly authenticated 
and authorised VO participants.  Central  to  the  storage aspect  of  the GOLD Middleware is  the 
information model describing the topology of the VO and the data and document types that can be 
exchanged between participating entities.  This is  a  key aspect  of  the system as it  supports  the 
extensibility needed to allow the infrastructure to be tailored to different problem domains. Another 
important requirement for the storage functionality is flexibility in terms of the physical locations 
that are used to store information. This is desirable as there may be situations where some VO 
members may prefer to store information on-site and then provide access to it, whilst others may 
want information stored and managed in central repositories. The GOLD Middleware must be able 
to support  both modes of operation simultaneously and provide seamless access to information 
regardless  of  its  physical  location.  Membership  information,  capabilities  of  potential  VO 
participants and other details that may be needed during the formation and operation of VOs are 
also part of this function.
3.3 Coordination
The operation of a VO requires planning, organising and dividing the collaborative project to be 
performed into a set of tasks which are then assigned to roles. Tasks are coordinated, and will either 
be performed manually or automatically. Although there are some tasks performed within the VO 
that  can be automatically  enacted as a  workflow,  there is  a  strong possibility  that  longer  term 
projects  performed by VO members will  follow a more “organic” path. Collaborative chemical 
process development is a particularly good example of this as many projects are executed on a 
partially ad-hoc basis where the exact workflow that will be followed during the project is unknown 
at  the  start.  The  GOLD  Middleware  must  therefore  support  not  only  the  enactment  of  pre-
determined  workflows,  but  also  provide  a  flexible  environment  that  does  not  follow  a  fixed 
workflow.
The Coordination elements ensure that interested parties are aware of events such as the publication 
of an updated information dossier.  Regardless of the coordination technologies adopted, (which 
could range from a simple exchange of messages, through a shared information space, to a fully 
fledged workflow enactment system) the parties are able to register (or be automatically registered 
due to other, earlier activities) to receive updates when certain events take place.
3.4 Regulation
The Regulation aspect of the architecture aims to ensure that entities who interact within a VO are 
able to exercise their rights and that, at the same time, they meet their obligations to one another and 
to any relevant regulatory body. The rights and obligations that are monitored and enforced by the 
GOLD Middleware fall into two categories:
• Service  Level  Agreements  (SLAs)  which  monitor  the  statistical  performance  of  offered 
services;
• Business Agreements that govern the interactions between the VO participants.
Whilst  SLAs can be encoded directly  into rules  that  can be monitored automatically,  Business 
Agreements tend to be more complex and rely upon a certain degree of interpretation in order to be 
enforced. In situations where the GOLD Middleware cannot directly monitor agreements, support 
for thorough logging and monitoring provides the required evidence in the event of any disputes 
between the participants.
Regulation is required during out-sourcing as a range of activities are required to be performed, 
which need to be carried out to a specified deadline and to some quality of service metric. For 
instance, an R&D company may request that a partner provide a detailed health and safety analysis 
of some aspect of the manufacturing process. It is expected that this analysis report:
• is delivered on or before a given date;
• identifies the risks inherent in the process;
• contains the correct analyses to assess the full impact of the risks;
These expectations form the basis of a contract between the two companies, whether explicit or 
implicit,  and it  is  against  such a  contract  that  the resulting report  is  checked.  The validity  (or 
invalidity) of the report would then be recorded to provide an audit trail for later analysis in the 
event of a dispute.
4 Service Definitions
To support the architectural elements introduced in section  3, the GOLD project has derived and 
implemented a number of core services. Figure 4 shows these GOLD services and their relationship 
to the architectural elements.
Figure 4 - Web Service oriented infrastructure
This section of the paper describes the technical implementation details of the architecture and 
describes the set of services that are required to support interactions and events which occur in the 
scenario outlined in Section 2.
4.1 Security
When granting personnel from an external company access to internal resources, or when a certain 
dossier  is placed in a shared information space, it  may be necessary to restrict access to those 
resources. To address this issue, the security element of the GOLD architecture is implemented in 
the form of authentication and authorisation services which enable members of a VO to define the 
roles relevant to their project in a central or federated manner. These roles can then be assigned 
access rights to resources locally, based on the work required to be carried out. In addition these 
rights  can also be  updated depending upon the stage of  a  project  allowing fine-grained access 
control.
4.1.1 Authentication
Authentication describes the process of securely establishing and verifying identities of network 
subjects  which  may  take  the  form  of  users,  agents,  registered  services  or  components.  The 
objectives of the authentication mechanism of the GOLD Middleware are twofold:
• to make sure that only the correct participants enter and operate within the VO;
• to  allow  the  participants  to  interact freely (within  the  range  set  by  the  access  control 
policies) with the various services and resources provided by the VO.
During the lifetime of a VO its participants will be required to share resources and hence access to 
those resources will require crossing of organisational boundaries. Participants in a VO are assumed 
to have implemented their own security mechanisms to protect resources within their boundaries by 
some authentication mechanisms. As part of the activities of a VO a participant may require access 
to several resources located behind organisational boundaries, this leads to potential problems due 
to the need for multiple logins. Clearly, expecting a VO participant to login several times in order to 
carry out a task that is part of the same activity is not productive. Several approaches have been 
proposed, most notably Microsoft Passport  [MS Passport 2005] and the Liberty Alliance Group 
[Liberty  2005].  MS  Passport  offers  a  centralised  approach  where  identities  are  stored  and 
distributed from a central entity, while the Liberty Alliance Group assumes that an agreement is in 
place between identity providers and service providers to respect the federated identity of a VO 
participant.  VO  participants  can  then  agree  on  a  VO-wide  identity  (other  than  their  private 
information) which can be a number or an alphanumeric string that is valid for the duration and 
scope of that VO. Participants can maintain control of their own private information as long as there 
is a traceable link between the federated identity and their credentials. While the federated approach 
tackles the issue of identity control described earlier, it lacks flexibility as it assumes a circle of trust 
between the participants of that federation. A significant problem that arises within a commercial 
context  [Conlin  et  al.  2005]  is  that  of  parties  disagreeing  on  the  authorities  they  trust;  the 
assumption of  the  presence  of  a  “circle  of  trust”  may not  always be valid.  Hence  support  for 
brokered  trust  relationships  may  be  needed.  The  infrastructure  therefore  needs  to  give  the 
participants in a VO the option of validating an assertion by authorities that may not be directly 
linked with the VO. This is achieved through the use of WS Trust [2005] protocols that manage 
broker trust relationships.
An infrastructure should not dictate which authorities every participant within a VO must trust, but 
it  should provide  the  underlying protocols  that  allow participants  of  a  VO to validate  security 
related assertions by authorities which individual participants trust. To outline the authentication 
process,  consider as an example, the scenario presented in Section 2.1.1. The initiator of the VO, 
the Supplier company S, which we assume is the authority that forms the VO and implements the 
infrastructure, would require that the other companies involved, the Route Development company, 
the Scale-Up company, and the Toll Manufacturer, be authenticated. So, in the first instance all VO 
participants must login to the VO. This is done by providing some details (username and password, 
X.509 certificate or  other  security  token)  which  are  validated  by  the  VO infrastructure.  Upon 
validation of these details the VO infrastructure issues a federated identity to each authenticated 
participant which is then used to access services and resources. For reasons such as data protection 
and privacy the infrastructure issues a federated identity valid only within the VO. Participants can 
therefore retain their  privacy as the federated identity does not identify the real  identity of the 
participant. This implies that the infrastructure maintains a traceable link between the federated 
identity and the real  identity  of  the participant,  allowing both accountability and privacy to  be 
supported.  Secure  message  exchange  between  the  VO  participants  is  achieved  by  exchanging 
security tokens carried within the headers of the exchanged messages. The federation service signs 
and attaches these tokens to SOAP message headers according to the WS-Security specification 
[WS-Security 2004]. The specification supports various token structures such as X.509 certificates, 
Username  or  XML-based  tokens  which  have  been  customised,  in  the  GOLD  Middleware,  to 
support SAML [OASIS 2004] assertions. The structure of a message carrying a token is shown in 
Figure 5 and the lifecycle of such a token from request to validation is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 5 - Secure message structure
Figure 6 - Security token lifecycle
In  Figure 5 the body of  the message carries  the actual  message while  the header  is  structured 
according  to  WS-Security  specification  and  carries  a  security  token  formatted  in  one  of  the 
standardised styles described earlier. It can be seen in  Figure 6 that, during the token life cycle, 
signed tokens are issued to participants from the GOLD middleware. Upon validation of the token, 
access  to  the  resource  is  granted.  The  above  description  implies  that  a  federation  has  been 
established and that there is a direct trust relationship between the federation and the participants. If 
this direct relationship is not present the above model fails. To alleviate this problem the GOLD 
middleware makes use of the WS-Trust [2005] specification that offers a mechanism for managing 
brokered trust relationships. This defines a set of protocols for handling tokens and validating them 
in the absence of a direct trust relationship. This process is illustrated in figure 7.
Figure 7 - Security token validation via brokered trust relationships
P2 fails to validate the security token issued by the GOLD middleware which would imply a lack of 
direct trust between them. Using the protocols specified by WS-Trust, the token can be send for 
validation to certificate authorities outside the scope of the VO. As shown in figure 7 CA1 trusts the 
GOLD token authority  and as  such validates  its  token.  P2 in  response grants  P1 access  to  its 
resource.
4.1.2 Authorisation
Periorellis  et  al.  [2004]  discussed  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  access  control  models, 
ranging  from access  control  lists  to  role  and  task  based  systems.  From this  discussion  it  was 
concluded that the dynamic nature of VOs makes it necessary for the VO infrastructure to support 
mechanisms that deal with dynamic rights activation and de-activation. In dynamic systems such as 
VOs, both the topology of the VO (the parties that form it, and the links between them) and its 
workflow are subject to change. Therefore static rights assignment prior to a workflow enactment 
does  not  capture  the  eventuality  of  a  participant  joining or  leaving,  or  other  alterations  to  the 
workflow. Several authors have elaborated on this issue [Coulouris and Dollimore 1994, Roshan 
and Sandhu 1997, Sandhu et  al.  1996, Thomas 1997].  In addition,  given the sensitivity  of the 
information that may be shared in some VOs, parties are not expected to be assigned a single set of 
rights that would last throughout the duration of a VO. It is more likely that VO participants would 
agree limited or gradual access to their resources depending on workflow progress. It is therefore 
desirable to assess access to resources against one's progress in the workflow. Rights should not be 
automatically  assumed upon rôle  assignment.  Instead  they  should  be  granted  gradually,  as  the 
workflow is progressing, prohibiting  access to parties that may be part of a workflow but are not 
fulfilling their obligations. 
The  view taken during  the  design  phase  of  the  GOLD Middleware  was  that  in  VOs,  specific 
instances of roles should be separate from the generic role templates, as different role instances may 
require different permissions and additional levels of authorization depending on the project and 
task in which they are active. In order to raise the levels of trust in those cases, it is important that 
adequately fine grained access control mechanisms are supported. Fine grained permissions are 
needed for instances of roles as well as instances of objects. For example, a chemist role from the 
Thermal  Safety company may be granted access to  chemical  documents  held by the  Scale-Up 
company that  relate  to  the current  project,  but  it  is  undesirable  however  to  grant  access  to  all 
chemical documents held by the Scale-Up company. Instead, any access permissions granted to the 
chemist role must be project-specific (e.g., the instance of a particular collaboration) as well as task-
specific (e.g. the instance of a particular pre-defined set of activities). The management of roles and 
access permissions in  the GOLD Middleware is  therefore integrated with the management  and 
monitoring of dynamic service level agreements or contracts between the participating services. 
Permissions for roles can be activated and de-activated based on the progress of the monitored 
contracts. There are several functionalities which the infrastructure has to support including:
• a  common  language  for  expressing  authorisation  policies  that  is  understood  by  all 
participants,
• a protocol for expressing policies and rules that is understood by all participants,
• a protocol for transferring/communicating these policies between VO participants,
• a centralised policy repository,
• a verification component which ensures policy consistency.
4.1.2.1 eXtensible Access Control Mark-up Language (XACML)
Access control policies within the GOLD Middleware are expressed using XACML which is a Web 
Services  standard  [OASIS  2003].  XACML  is  an  XML  based  language  for  expressing  and 
communicating access control policies between services. It provides a standard XML schema for 
expressing policies, rules, obligations and conditions. It also specifies a request/response language 
which allows queries to be expressed about whether a particular access should be allowed (requests) 
and associated replies to those queries (responses).  Policies are defined in terms of subjects, (i.e. 
users, machines, services etc) and resources (documents, machines etc), both are identified using 
URIs. The total number of subjects and resources together, define what the XACML specification 
terms  the  target  space.  Given  a  target  space,  rules  and  obligations  can  be  defined  and earlier 
publications provide detailed information and evaluation regarding the standard [Wu and Periorellis 
2005a].
Figure 8 - Access control service architecture
In Figure 8 which inllustrates the GOLD access control service, P represents a participant and the 
remainder of the boxes represent the services that have been implemented. VO participants (i.e. P1, 
P2 and P3) express their security requirements using the service interface. These requirements form 
a set of policies that describe how individual participants need their resources to be protected. The 
policies for the same project or workflow are placed in temporary storage where a verification 
service, see Section 4.1.2.2, will validate them for logical inconsistencies. The verification service 
guarantees that no exceptins will be thrown during VO operations as a result of policy mismatches. 
Any possible  mismatches  can  be  highlighted and compromises  negotiated between participants 
prior to the commencement of VO projects. Assuming that a participant  P, requests access to a 
resource, several services coordinate the process of expressing a request and providing a response. 
The Request Entry Point (REP) service provides an interface that accepts requests in the following 
form:
{subject/credential, resource-URI, action, project-id, VO-id}
The REP then translates these to XML documents which comply with the XACML request schema. 
The subject or credential refer to the identity of the requestor, while the resource-URI is the actual 
resource  identifier.  Action corresponds  to  the  reason  the  resource  is  requested  (which  is  also 
encoded in XACML).  Project-id is an identifier which corresponds to a specific project and the 
VO-id is an identifier which corresponds to the VO. It is assumed that the semantic information for 
the action element is established during the formation stage of the VO. The Request Decision Point 
(RDP) is the service that actually makes the decision on whether a request should be granted. Upon 
receipt of a request the RDP retrieves the relevant policy documents from the database, and an 
evaluation  takes  place.  This  is  done  through  a  collection  of  Combining  Algorithms  and  each 
algorithm represents a different method for combining multiple decisions into a single decision. 
There are Policy Combining Algorithms and Rule Combining Algorithms such as Deny Overrides 
and Permit Overrides. When a decision is reached, a response document is created (containing the 
decision) and forwarded to the Policy Enforcement Point. This service then parses the xml, retrieves 
the actual response and enforces the decision on participant P through whatever mechanisms were 
put in place within that particular VO.
4.1.2.2 Verification
Given  the  wide  range  of  policies  that  may  be  required  to  fully  specify  the  access  control 
requirements within a VO and the fact that there is no single authority governing these policies (the 
majority of which will  stem from participants’  requirements on how they want to protect their 
resources), verification is needed to ensure that there are no logical inconsistencies. The current 
service infrastructure uses Margrave, [Fishler et al. 2005, Greenburg et al. 2005] which is a tool for 
verifying XACML policies. In the GOLD Middleware, the tool has been wrapped as a Web Service 
and is used whenever a policy is added to, or altered in, the database to verify the consistency of the 
updated set of policies.
4.2 Storage
Within  a  VO there  is  a  need  to  store,  manage  and  access  information.  In  addition  there  is  a 
requirement  to  be able  to determine how a piece of information was derived.  The Information 
Management and Repository services meet this need by providing configurable information storage 
and logging/auditing functionality.
4.2.1 Information Management
VOs must control and manage the exchange of information between the participants, and the role of 
the information management service in the GOLD Middleware is to support this exchange in three 
ways:
• to ensure that there is a common structure and meaning for information shared across the 
VO;
• to provide information services and tools to support the controlled exchange of information 
according to the policies and contracts that are in place within the VO;
• to extract value from the information stored during the lifetime of a VO.
To support the information management requirements of VOs the GOLD Middleware provides an 
Information Model that defines the structure and meaning of information shared by its participants. 
This model can be divided into three categories:
• Generic - represents information that is required by all VOs. This includes descriptions of 
the VO structure,  the  participants,  the tasks  being  performed,  security  policies  etc.  The 
services  that  make  up  the  generic  GOLD  VO  infrastructure  (i.e.  those  comprising  the 
security,  coordination  and  regulation  architectural  elements)  all  exchange  information 
defined in this category of the information model.
• Domain specific - within a particular domain, there are types of information that are generic 
across a broad range of VOs. For example, in the chemical process development scenario, 
see Section 2.1.1, there are standard types of documents that are shared by all participants 
these include chemical data sheets, health and safety reports etc. Information in this category 
will be understood by domain specific services, but not the generic GOLD infrastructure 
services.
• Application  specific -  information  in  this  category  represents  specialist  information 
describing a particular chemical process, and would have to be defined and agreed by the 
participants in a VO when it is created. In the context of the scenario, documents relating to 
the specific project would exist at this level of the information model.
This information model is based on the myGrid information model [Sharman et al. 2004], which 
was designed to support VOs in the bioinfomatics domain. The GOLD model extends and refines 
this  to  support  generic  VOs.  Designing  and  implementing  services  and  tooling  to  support  the 
information model would be a time consuming task, consequently the GOLD Middleware provides 
support  for  the  generic  information  model  in  the  form of  services  and  tools,  so  reducing  the 
overheads  of  creating  a  new  VO  by  minimising  the  required  amount  of  bespoke  design  and 
development.
4.2.2 Repository
The repository service has been provided to hold the information created during the whole life-cycle 
of  VOs.  This service is  used by the other  generic  middleware services,  for  instance,  when the 
security services require information about the relationships between the two entities such as to 
determine if X is the manager of Y.
Part of the purpose of the repository service, is to provide provenance for the information stored, 
this aspect of the Repository Service records all the interactions between the services that comprise 
the VO. These are stored with additional information that allows them to be correlated, e.g. to link 
them to the producer and consumer, workflow tasks, passage of time etc. This provenance data is a 
valuable  resource,  supporting both the real-time and historic analysis  of the progress of a VO. 
Consequently, the GOLD project is developing a range of tools to exploit this information. For 
instance, tools that build upon the functionality offered by this service to provide:
• a management dashboard that allows the progress of the VO to be monitored in real time so 
that problems and blockages can be detected;
• a means of replaying the progress of a VO for post-mortem analysis. The aim is to gain an 
understanding of why a particular VO succeeded or failed;
• data mining tools to look for patterns in the provenance repository that indicate success or 
failure. If these can be found then run-time monitoring for these patterns could be added into 
the infrastructure so that relevant participants can be alerted to potential problems so that 
action to rectify them can be taken.
Information security is a major issue for a typical VO therefore, access to the information services 
is controlled by the security elements of the GOLD Middleware, with policies and contracts being 
enforced when requests are made to access information. Examples of this include ensuring that only 
those acting in specific roles have the right to update particular instances of information (e.g. only 
those in an overall VO management role may be allowed to change deadlines), and ensuring that 
sensitive information can only be accessed by those with the appropriate authority. The information 
authorization rights given to participants in a VO can be fine-grained and complex; e.g. there may 
be a general policy that a manager can see all the data created by those who work for them, while a 
person in one organisation may only be able to delegate access to a person in another organisation 
with a manager’s permission.
4.3 Coordination
A  key  aspect  of  collaborative  working  is  to  have  some  means  of  ensuring  that  all 
interested/involved  VO  particpants  receive  coordination  messages  and  notifications.  It  is  also 
necessary  to  ensure  that  tasks  are  performed  at  the  appropriate  time  and with  the  appropriate 
participants. This leads to a requirement for Notification and Enactment services.
4.3.1 Notification
VO participants  are  informed  about  certain  events  that  take  place  within  the  VO through  the 
notification service. Interests are expressed via a subscription service, which registers participant’s 
interest in certain events while notification messages are sent by the GOLD Middleware. Given the 
potentially large number of participants, it is desirable to decouple the publishers of the notification 
messages from the consumers. In addition, given the potential fluidity of the VO the publisher need 
not know the consumers of those messages as the infrastructure is accountable for maintaining track 
of consumers and message routing. A full set of requirements for notification have been expressed 
by  Krishna  et  al.  [2003].  There  are  currently  two  competing  Web  Service  specifications  for 
notification:
• WS-Eventing [WS-Eventing 2004];
• WS-Notification [WS-Notification 2005].
The GOLD infrastructure has adopted the simpler WS-Eventing model which specifies a simple 
architecture  for  subscribing,  producing and delivering notification messages.  It  supports  typical 
subscription operations such as subscribe, un-subscribe and renew, while the delivery mechanism is 
based on the pull model similar to  OMG’s CORBA notification model  [Bolton 2001].  When the 
participant subscribes to GOLD’s notification service, the service includes information regarding 
the subscription management service in its response. Subsequent operations, such as getting the 
status of,  renewing and unsubscribing, are all directed to the subscription manager.  The  source 
(producer) sends both notifications and a message signifying the end of registered subscriptions to 
the sink (consumer).
To provide notification services the GOLD Middleware makes use of NaradaBrokering [Pallickara 
and  Fox  2003]  which  is  a  mature,  open  source,  distributed  messaging  infrastructure. 
NaradaBrokering  can support  a  number  of  notification and messaging standards,  notably:  JMS 
[JMS 2001],  WS-Eventing  and  WS-Notification.  It  is,  therefore,  suitable  for  intra-  and  inter-
organisational notification. In the context of a VO, a significant advantage of a notification service 
built on NaradaBrokering is the flexibility of deployment options. The service could be deployed as 
a stand-alone service at a single site or, alternatively, as a peer-to-peer network of Narada brokers 
offering a federated notification service. For example, the notification service could be distributed 
across a set of Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) that support the VO or across the members of the VO 
itself.  In  either  deployment  NaradaBrokering  provides  scalable,  secure  and efficient  routing  of 
notifications.
4.3.2 Enactment
The enactment service operates in conjunction with the core GOLD Middleware services to provide 
support  for  coordination and workflow. The main components  of  the service are the workflow 
editor and the workflow enactment engine, see  Figure 9. In addition, there are custom workflow 
tasks for manipulating VOs and managing documents.
Figure 9 - Enactment service
In Figure 9, participant P describes a workflow using a workflow editor and saves the output in a 
storage  facility.  Workflows  may  be  represented  graphically  using  an  editor  that  subsequently 
creates  an  XML  output  document  structured  according  to  the  BPEL4WS  (Business  Process 
Enactment Language for Web Services) specification [BPEL4WS 2002]. The technology provides 
an XML schema (currently being considered as an OASIS standard) for describing tasks, roles, 
inputs, outputs, pre and post conditions associated with each task. During workflow enactment, the 
workflow engine retrieves BPEL4WS documents  and executes them, subsequently sending any 
notifications required to subscribers (S) interested in the state of the coordination activities. GOLD 
adopted ActiveBPEL [Emmerich et al.  2005] for workflow execution.  The workflow enactment 
service  responds  to  requests  by  initiating  workflows  to  co-ordinate  interactions  between  VO 
members. For example, the process of approving a chemical safety study may involve passing this 
study to several approvers, each of which must sign the document before it is considered complete. 
The enactment engine notifies the participants about events and required activities, depending on 
the topics participants have registered for. For situations where it is not necessary to co-ordinate the 
detailed activities of VO participants, the GOLD Middleware can be used to provide an abstraction 
with a lower degree of integration, for instance a shared space that contains projects that are divided 
into discrete tasks. Each of these tasks can contain a set of data, which can be accessed and edited 
by  participants  with  the  correct  security  credentials.  These  documents  can  include  any  of  the 
information types supported within the VO, including the results of any enacted workflows, and any 
workflows that are still on-going.
4.4 Regulation
Regulation helps govern interactions between parties, ensuring that participants’ rights (in terms of 
the resources they are allowed to access) are properly granted and that obligations are properly 
dispatched (such as making resources available to others). This is  achieved by the use of contracts 
and  contract  enforcement  mechanisms  as  well  as  monitoring  mechanisms  for  auditing  and 
accountability. 
4.4.1 Contract Enactment
Each member of a VO requires that their interests are protected, specifically:
• that other members comply with contracts governing the VO;
• that  their  own legitimate actions (such as delivery of  work,  commission of  service) are 
recognised;
• that other members are accountable for their actions.
To support this, the GOLD Middleware records all activities to monitor for compliance with the 
regulatory  regime.  Furthermore,  critical  interactions  between  VO  participants  should  be  non-
repudiable (no party should be able to deny their participation) and the auditing and monitoring 
functions must be fair (misbehaviour should not disadvantage well-behaved parties). For example, a 
business  contract  governing  the  scenario  described  in  Section  2.1.1 will  specify  sequencing 
constraints on the production of documents such as the requirements, recipe, thermal analysis and 
scale-up analysis. It will also require that the safety of the scaled up process is assured, hence the 
requirement that the the Scale-Up company employ the Thermal Safety company to provide an 
analysis and validation of the potential exotherm that was identified during the scale up studies.
In a complex natural language contract of the form typically negotiated between business partners, 
there may in fact  be ambiguities that,  given the sequencing constraints, could lead to deadlock 
during  the  chemical  process  development  project.  There  is,  therefore,  a  need  to  produce  an 
electronic version of the contract that can be model-checked for correctness properties (e.g. safety 
and liveness). Having developed a contract that is free of ambiguities, it should then be possible to 
derive an executable version to regulate an interaction at run-time. That is, the business messages 
exchanged between participants during the process development should be validated with respect to 
the executable contract to ensure that they comply with contractual constraints. To hold participants 
to  account,  and to  be  able  to  resolve subsequent  disputes,  these message  exchanges should be 
audited.  In  the  scenario  described  in  Section  2.1.1,  the  Scale-Up  company sends  the  Supplier 
company the scale-up model. The delivery of this document should be validated against the contract 
to ensure any pre-requisite obligations have been fulfilled. To safeguard their interests, the Supplier 
company will require evidence that the model originated at the Scale-Up company. Similarly, the 
Scale-Up company will require evidence that they fulfilled their obligation to deliver the model to 
the Supplier company.
Given these requirements, we identify two main aspects to contract enactment and accountability:
• high level mechanisms to encode business contracts so that they are amenable to integrity 
and consistency checking and in order to derive an executable form of contract;
• a middleware infrastructure that can monitor a given interaction for conformance with the 
executable contract - ensuring accountability and acknowledgement.
To address  the  first  aspect,  Section  4.4.1.1 provides  a  summary of  work  on  the  derivation  of 
electronic contracts and deployment models for contract mediated interaction. This work appears in 
Molina et al. [2005], which also presents related work. The GOLD project extends this work to 
enact  business  contracts  using  infrastructure  for  accountability  and  non-repudiation  as  an 
enforcement mechanism. Section 4.4.2 presents this infrastructure and shows how it addresses the 
second  aspect  identified  above.  This  paper  is  concerned  with  monitoring  and  enforcement  of 
business operation clauses, of equal importance is the monitoring of the levels of Quality of the 
Service (QoS) offered within a VO. This concerns the collection of statistical metrics about the 
performance of a service to evaluate whether a provider complies with the QoS that the consumer 
expects. Molina et al. [2004] examine this aspect of regulation and related work.
4.4.1.1 Contract-mediated interaction
The rules in a conventional, paper-based contract express what operations business partners are:
• permitted to perform if deemed necessary to fulfill the contract;
• obliged to perform to ensure contract fulfillment;
• prohibited from performing as these actions would be illegal, unfair or detrimental to the 
other partners.
In addition, rules may stipulate when and in what order the operations are to be executed. To form 
and automatically manage partnerships within a VO, electronic representations of contracts must be 
used to mediate the rights and obligations that each member promises to honour. In the worst case, 
violations  of  agreed  interactions  are  detected  and notified  to  all  interested  parties.  In  order  to 
support this, the original natural language contract that is in place to govern interactions between 
participants has to undergo a conversion process from its original format into an executable contract 
(x-contract)  that  works  as  a  mediator  of  the  business  conversations.  This  conversion  process 
involves the creation, with the help of a formal notation, of one or more computational models of 
the contract with different levels of details.  To achieve these objectives,  the  Promela modeling 
language  [Holzmann  1991]  is  used  to  represent  all  the  basic  parameters  that  typical  business 
contracts comprise, such as permissions, obligations, prohibitions, actors (agents), time constraints, 
and message type  checking.  The  Promela representation can  be  validated  with the  help of  the 
accompanying  Spin model-checker  tool  [Holzmann  2004].  For  example,  model-checking  the 
Promela representation can improve the original natural  language contract by removing various 
forms  of  inconsistency  as  discussed  in  Solaiman  et  al.  [2003].  This  implementation  neutral 
representation  can  be  refined  to  include  technical  details  such  as  acknowledgment  and 
synchronisation messages. The details will vary depending on specific implementation techniques 
and standards that are adopted. This implementation specific representation can then be used for 
run-time monitoring. Conceptually, an x-contract is placed between VO members to regulate their 
business interactions. In terms of the interaction model, the x-contract may be reactive or proactive. 
A  reactive  x-contract  intercepts  business  messages,  validates  the  messages  and  rejects  invalid 
messages. A proactive x-contract drives the cross-organisational business process by inviting VO 
members to send legal messages of the right type,  in correct sequence,  at  the correct time etc. 
Deployment can be either centralised or distributed. This leads to four deployment models:
• Reactive central - where all messages are intercepted by a centralised x-contract (at a TTP, 
for example) that is responsible for forwarding just the legal messages to their intended 
destination.
• Proactive central - where a centralised x-contract coordinates the business process on behalf 
of VO members and triggers the exchange of legal messages.
• Reactive distributed - where the x-contract is split into separate components that can be used 
to  validate  just  those  messages  sent  to  an  individual  VO member  and  to  reject  illegal 
messages sent to that member.
• Proactive distributed - a distributed version of proactive central that coordinates the legal 
participation of each member in the business process.
Distributed  deployments  face  the  difficult  challenge  of  keeping  contract  state  information 
synchronised at both ends. For example, a valid message forwarded by the buyer’s x-contract could 
be  dropped  at  the  seller’s  end  because  intervening  communication  delays  render  the  message 
untimely (and therefore invalid) at the seller side. State synchronisation is necessary to ensure that 
both the parties agree to treat the message as either valid or invalid. One approach that uses a non-
repudiable state synchronisation protocol [Cook et al. 2002] is described in Molina et al. [2003]. 
The GOLD Middleware used to invoke validation with respect to a contract at runtime is discussed 
below in Section 4.4.2.
4.4.2 Accountability
This section focuses on accountability for the delivery of a single business message. However, this 
validated and non-repudiable message delivery can then be used as a building block for contract 
monitoring and enforcement of the kind envisaged in Section 4.4.1.
Figure 10 - Business message delivery with acknowledgements
Figure 10 shows the delivery of a business message and associated acknowledgements. Typically, 
for each business message, there should be an immediate acknowledgement of receipt - indicating 
successful delivery of the message. Eventually, a second acknowledgement indicates whether the 
original business message is valid (or invalid) in the context of the given interaction. Finally, the 
validation  message  is  acknowledged  in  return.  Validation  of  the  original  business  message 
(performed at B) can be arbitrarily complex. For example, it may simply involve verification that a 
message is syntactically valid and in the correct sequence with respect to a contract. Alternatively, a 
message may require validation with respect to more complex contractual conditions or with respect 
to local application state. Triggering validation at the level of business message delivery has the 
potential to allow specialization of an application to meet the constraints of different regulatory 
regimes. Web Services are increasingly used to enable B2B interactions of this kind.  However, 
there  is  currently  no  support  to  make  the  exchange  of  a  set  of  business  messages  (and  their 
associated acknowledgements) both fair and non-repudiable. For example, in the scenario described 
in Section 2.1.1, there is no systematic support to prevent the Scale-Up company from denying that 
they submitted the scale-up model and at the same time to prevent the Supplier company from 
denying its receipt. A flexible framework for fair, non-repudiable message delivery has therefore 
been developed. The Web Services implementation of this framework comprises a set of services 
that are invoked at the middleware level and so enable the Web Services developer to concentrate 
on business functions. The GOLD Middleware renders the exchange of business messages fair and 
non-repudiable.  Arbitrarily  complex,  application-level  validation  is  supported  through  the 
registration  of  message  validators.  The  framework  is  sufficiently  flexible  to  adapt  to  different 
application requirements and, in particular, to execute different non-repudiation protocols to meet 
those requirements.
4.4.2.1 Basic concepts
Non-repudiation  is  the  inability  to  subsequently  deny  an  action  or  event.  In  the  context  of 
distributed  systems,  non-repudiation  is  applied  to  the  sending  and  receiving  of  messages.  For 
example, for the delivery of a message from A to B the following types of non-repudiation may be 
required:
• NRO - B may require Non-Repudiation of Origin of the message, i.e. irrefutable evidence 
that the message originated at A,
• NRR - A may require Non-Repudiation of Receipt of the message, i.e. irrefutable evidence 
that B received the message.
Non-repudiation is usually achieved using public key cryptography. If A signs a message with their 
private key, B can confirm the origin of the message by verifying the signature using A's public 
key, and vice versa. An additional requirement is that at the end of the interaction no well-behaved 
party is disadvantaged. For example, consider the selective receipt problem where a sender provides 
NRO but the recipient does not provide the corresponding NRR. This problem is addressed by the 
fair exchange of items where fairness is the property that all parties obtain their expected items or 
no party receives any useful information about the items to be exchanged [Markowitch et al. 2002]. 
Kremer et al.  [2002] provide a survey of protocols to achieve fair,  non-repudiable exchange of 
messages. The following discussion is based on the use of an in-line TTP to support the exchange. 
However, our execution framework is not restricted to this class of protocol.
4.4.2.2 Overview of approach
Figure 11 - Executing a business interaction through a delivery agent
Figure 11 introduces a Delivery Agent (DA), or inline TTP, to the interaction shown in Figure 10. 
Four types of evidence are generated:
• NRO - Non-Repudiation of origin that msg originated at A;
• NRS - Non-Repudiation of submission to the DA of msg and NRO;
• NRR - Non-Repudiation of receipt of msg by B;
• NRV - Non-Repudiation of validation, valid or otherwise, as determined by validation of 
msg by B.
A starts an exchange by sending a message, with proof of origin, to the DA. This is the equivalent 
of message 1 in Figure 10 with the NRO appended. The DA exchanges msg and NRO for NRR with 
B (before application-level validation of  msg). Then the DA provides NRR to  A - equivalent to 
message  2  in  Figure  10 Subsequently,  B performs  application-level  validation  of  msg (as  in 
message 3 of  Figure 10 and provides NRV to the DA. The DA, in turn, provides NRV to  A and 
provides acknowledgement of NRV to B. The exact sequence of the exchange will be dictated by 
the actual protocol used and should not be inferred from Figure 11.
Figure 12 - Interceptor approach
As shown in Figure 12, our approach is to deploy interceptors that act on behalf of the end users in 
an interaction. An interceptor has two main functions:
• to  protect  the  interests  of  the  party  on  whose  behalf  it  acts  by  executing  appropriate 
protocols and accessing appropriate services, including TTP services;
• to abstract away the detail of the mechanisms used to render an interaction safe and reliable 
for its end user.
In this case, the mechanism used communicates through the DA. It is the responsibility of the DA to 
ensure fairness and liveness for  well-behaved parties in interactions that  the DA supports.  The 
introduction of interceptors means,  that  as far  as possible,  A and  B are  free to  concentrate  on 
application level concerns while their interaction is rendered fair and non-repudiable.
4.4.2.3 Web Services-based protocol execution
In this section a Web Services based implementation of a framework for non-repudiation protocol 
execution (WS-NRExchange) is presented. The combination of an interceptor based approach and a 
generic interface to protocol execution allows the infrastructure to adapt to different application 
requirements, including the execution of different protocols, without disturbing application-level 
logic.
Figure 13 - WS-NRExchange architecture
Figure 13 shows the interactions between the various components and services that make up the 
implementation.  DA,  A and  B each  provide  an  NRExchange  Web Service  that  manages  their 
participation in non-repudiation protocols. The SOAP messages exchanged comply with the WS-
Security  specification.  At  A and  B the NRExchange service is  deployed as  an interceptor  that 
mediates Web Service interactions that require non-repudiation. This interceptor may be co-located 
with the local application that uses it or may, for example, be part of a corporate firewall service. 
The  NRExchange  services  access  additional  local  services  for  signing  evidence,  message 
persistence and application-level validation. The NRExchange services also access trusted time-
stamping services and public key management  services (for example,  Digital  Signature Service 
(DSS) [Perrin et al. 2003] and XML Key Management (XKMS) [XKMS 2005] services provided 
by third parties). Reliable messaging [WS-ReliableMessaging 2004, WS-Reliability 2004] is used 
to  satisfy  a  requirement  for  at  least  once  message  delivery between well-behaved parties.  The 
NRExchange  Web  Service  also  provides  a  local  interface  to  allow registration  of  application-
specific listeners for message validation and other events. A message validation listener may trigger 
arbitrarily  complex  validation  of  a  business  message.  For  example,  the  validation listener  may 
appeal to an x-contract of the sort  described in Section  4.4.1.1.  Messages that are  found to be 
invalid  with respect  to  the  contract  are  logged but  are  not  passed to  the target  application for 
processing. Further information can be found in Robinson et al. [2005] along with protocol details 
and a survey of related work.
4.4.2.4 Composing validated message exchanges
The presentation above describes a  single  primitive for  validated,  fair,  non-repudiable  message 
delivery.  To  support  more  complex  interactions  and  different  application  level  semantics,  the 
GOLD  Middleware  will  allow  the  composition  of  message  delivery  primitives  into  Message 
Exchange Patterns  (MEPs).  These  compositions  may also  be  instrumented  to  provide  different 
fairness and non-repudiation guarantees as demanded by a given interaction context (for example, 
to respond to different trust relationships between participants).
Figure 14 - Message exchange pattern composition
Figure 14 shows the components for composition of MEPs. At the lowest level message delivery is 
achieved through protocol execution between NRExchange services. A series of message delivery 
primitives are built on the following protocol execution layer:
• send without non-repudiation;
• send with non-repudiation of origin;
• fair send with guaranteed exchange of NRO for NRR.
Generic MEPs are then composed from these primitives. An example being correlated sends to 
achieve request/response application semantics. Generic MEPs can also be composed into domain-
specific MEPs to meet industry-specific requirements. Similarly, the abstraction of synchronized 
shared information alluded to in Section 4.4.1 can be implemented as domain-specific MEPs based 
on previous work [Cook et al. 2002]. As shown in Figure 14, message validation can be invoked at 
each level, providing a chain of responsibility for validation appropriate to the given level.
5 Conclusions
Issues in collaborative working within chemical process development have been described along 
with the solutions available through the use of the middleware and services developed as part of the 
GOLD project. A prototype has been built and is being used to evaluate the approach against a real 
VO scenario taken from industry. Whilst the application driver for the GOLD project is derived 
from the chemical process development industry, the infrastructure has been designed to be generic, 
and able to support VOs in other domains. The design of the architecture allows the domain specific 
functionality  to  be  introduced by  configuring  the  generic  GOLD Middleware,  for  instance  the 
chemical  specific  data  and relationships  could be  represented as  a  data  model  held within  the 
information management and storage services rather than hard coded in the respective services. It is 
envisaged that this is an area where service providers could offer value-added services to their 
customers.  A key requirement of VOs is the ability to integrate  businesses very tightly,  whilst 
maintaining flexibility, as can  VOs change over time, often rapidly and without warning.  VO 
technology must support this flexible environment whilst enabling sufficiently tight integration so 
that participants can work together effectively. GOLD's unique infrastructural approach provides 
this balance between flexibility and integration.
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